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NATO. Il ritorno della speranza a Kabul. L’importanza dell’informazione, della sorveglianza e dell’identificazione dei pericoli

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03 Novembre 2014

Fonte: NATO

Tra le molte facce delle azioni NATO

Afghanistan: Return To Hope

 

Meet Nancy Hatch, an 86-year-old historian who has documented Afghanistan’s history since the 1960s, despite being thrown out for a decade by the Soviets and kept out by the Taliban.  She is the only Western woman to spend 6 decades there – and have tea with Osama bin Laden. Read her amazing account on the Return to Hope website, which weaves together the story of Afghanistan as told by some of the extraordinary people who returned there, determined to help create a better country.
The website stands as a virtual testimony to the NATO mission in Afghanistan. Rich in strikingly beautiful images, the site offers immersive soundscapes and high-definition video. It features personal interviews with key actors of varying perspectives, explores the history, charts the challenges and achievements and recognises the sacrifice of thousands of men and women from Afghanistan and around the world.
www.ReturnToHope.com
#ReturnToHope

 

Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR)

Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance is vital for all military operations. It provides information and intelligence to decision-makers and action-takers, helping them make informed, timely and accurate decisions. While surveillance and reconnaissance can answer the questions “what,” “when” and “where”, the combined elements from various intelligence sources and disciplines provide the answers to “how” and “why”. When all of this is combined, you create Joint ISR.
For over 60 years, the enduring success of NATO has been achieved through the close cooperation between Allies who are driven by a shared set of democratic beliefs and values.  These Allies work together in NATO to bring stability to a complex 21st century security environment.
NATO’s 2012 Chicago Summit established the objective to strengthen cooperation and ensure tighter connections between Allied forces. During the Summit, the Allied Heads of State and Government expressed the ambition to provide NATO with an enduring and permanently available JISR capability, giving the Alliance the eyes and ears it needs to achieve strategic decision advantage.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) provides the foundation for all military operations, and its principles have been used in warfare for centuries. The individual elements of ISR are:
    • Intelligence: the final product derived from surveillance and reconnaissance, fused with other information;
    • Surveillance: the persistent monitoring of a target; and
    • Reconnaissance: information-gathering conducted to answer a specific military question.
Both surveillance and reconnaissance can include visual observation (for example soldiers on the ground covertly watching a target, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) with cameras), as well as electronic observation.
The difference between surveillance and reconnaissance has to do with time and specificity; surveillance is a more prolonged and deliberate activity, while reconnaissance missions are generally rapid and targeted to retrieve specific information.
Once surveillance and reconnaissance information has been obtained, intelligence specialists can analyse it, fuse it with other information from other data sources and produce the intelligence which is then used to inform military and civilian decision-makers, particularly for the planning and conduct of operations.
While all countries have their own sources and methods for the production of intelligence, it is not always easy for them to share their intelligence with Allies.  Sometimes this is due to security concerns, sometimes to internal procedural requirements, and sometimes to technological constraints.
The objective of NATO Joint ISR is to champion the concept of “need to share” over the concept of “need to know.”  This does not mean that all Allies will automatically share everything, but rather that NATO can facilitate the procedures and technology to promote sharing while simultaneously providing information assurance (i.e., the protection of data and networks).  This way, Allies can have a holistic picture of whatever crisis is occurring and NATO decision-makers can make well-informed, timely and accurate decisions.
To achieve this ambition, the following must be in place:
  1. Trained ISR experts Having a cadre of experts within NATO who fully understand how to use ISR to support NATO’s decision-makers; and
  2. Information assurance: protection of data and networks Special procedures need to be in place to provide information assurance; it takes time and resources to obtain a genuinely efficient, secure, holistic and relevant Joint ISR system. In fact, it took ten years to develop the successful mission network used in Afghanistan, and NATO intends to capitalise on that effort.
The experience the Alliance gained from its operations in Afghanistan and Libya has resulted in collection assets (for example information gathering equipment such as surveillance aircraft) becoming far more accessible to military personnel, even at the lowest tactical levels. Assets that would have been used only for strategic purposes at the discretion of military generals 15 years ago are now widely available and their use is decentralised. This shift occurred because NATO member countries procured significant numbers of maritime, land and airborne collection assets to help them locate adversaries, who often operate in complex environments and among civilian populations.
To enable information-gathering to take place, and to ensure that information is analysed and intelligence is produced for decision-makers, there are a number of primary actors involved, including:
    • Surveillance and reconnaissance collection assets Their role is to collect information. Examples include Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS), AWACS aircraft which use radar, observation satellites, electronic assets and special ground reconnaissance troops.
    • Intelligence analysts Their role is to exploit and analyse information from multiple sources. Examples include national military and civilian analysts working at the strategic level in intelligence organisations, imagery analysts at all levels, and encryption experts.
    • Decision-makers Their role is to use intelligence to inform their decision-making. Examples include political leaders and military commanders.
  • Components

  • Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) provides the foundation for all military operations, and its principles have been used in warfare for centuries. The individual elements of ISR are:
    Mechanism
      • Intelligence: the final product derived from surveillance and reconnaissance, fused with other information;
      • Surveillance: the persistent monitoring of a target; and
      • Reconnaissance: information-gathering conducted to answer a specific military question.
    Both surveillance and reconnaissance can include visual observation (for example soldiers on the ground covertly watching a target, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) with cameras), as well as electronic observation.
    The difference between surveillance and reconnaissance has to do with time and specificity; surveillance is a more prolonged and deliberate activity, while reconnaissance missions are generally rapid and targeted to retrieve specific information.
    Once surveillance and reconnaissance information has been obtained, intelligence specialists can analyse it, fuse it with other information from other data sources and produce the intelligence which is then used to inform military and civilian decision-makers, particularly for the planning and conduct of operations.
    While all countries have their own sources and methods for the production of intelligence, it is not always easy for them to share their intelligence with Allies.  Sometimes this is due to security concerns, sometimes to internal procedural requirements, and sometimes to technological constraints.
    The objective of NATO Joint ISR is to champion the concept of “need to share” over the concept of “need to know.”  This does not mean that all Allies will automatically share everything, but rather that NATO can facilitate the procedures and technology to promote sharing while simultaneously providing information assurance (i.e., the protection of data and networks).  This way, Allies can have a holistic picture of whatever crisis is occurring and NATO decision-makers can make well-informed, timely and accurate decisions.
    To achieve this ambition, the following must be in place:
    1. Trained ISR experts Having a cadre of experts within NATO who fully understand how to use ISR to support NATO’s decision-makers; and
    2. Information assurance: protection of data and networks Special procedures need to be in place to provide information assurance; it takes time and resources to obtain a genuinely efficient, secure, holistic and relevant Joint ISR system. In fact, it took ten years to develop the successful mission network used in Afghanistan, and NATO intends to capitalise on that effort.
  • The experience the Alliance gained from its operations in Afghanistan and Libya has resulted in collection assets (for example information gathering equipment such as surveillance aircraft) becoming far more accessible to military personnel, even at the lowest tactical levels. Assets that would have been used only for strategic purposes at the discretion of military generals 15 years ago are now widely available and their use is decentralised. This shift occurred because NATO member countries procured significant numbers of maritime, land and airborne collection assets to help them locate adversaries, who often operate in complex environments and among civilian populations.
    To enable information-gathering to take place, and to ensure that information is analysed and intelligence is produced for decision-makers, there are a number of primary actors involved, including:
      • Surveillance and reconnaissance collection assets Their role is to collect information. Examples include Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS), AWACS aircraft which use radar, observation satellites, electronic assets and special ground reconnaissance troops.
      • Intelligence analysts Their role is to exploit and analyse information from multiple sources. Examples include national military and civilian analysts working at the strategic level in intelligence organisations, imagery analysts at all levels, and encryption experts.
      • Decision-makers Their role is to use intelligence to inform their decision-making. Examples include political leaders and military commanders.
      • Components
      • Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) provides the foundation for all military operations, and its principles have been used in warfare for centuries. The individual elements of ISR are:
          • Intelligence: the final product derived from surveillance and reconnaissance, fused with other information;
          • Surveillance: the persistent monitoring of a target; and
          • Reconnaissance: information-gathering conducted to answer a specific military question.
        Both surveillance and reconnaissance can include visual observation (for example soldiers on the ground covertly watching a target, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) with cameras), as well as electronic observation.
        The difference between surveillance and reconnaissance has to do with time and specificity; surveillance is a more prolonged and deliberate activity, while reconnaissance missions are generally rapid and targeted to retrieve specific information.
        Once surveillance and reconnaissance information has been obtained, intelligence specialists can analyse it, fuse it with other information from other data sources and produce the intelligence which is then used to inform military and civilian decision-makers, particularly for the planning and conduct of operations.
        While all countries have their own sources and methods for the production of intelligence, it is not always easy for them to share their intelligence with Allies.  Sometimes this is due to security concerns, sometimes to internal procedural requirements, and sometimes to technological constraints.
        The objective of NATO Joint ISR is to champion the concept of “need to share” over the concept of “need to know.”  This does not mean that all Allies will automatically share everything, but rather that NATO can facilitate the procedures and technology to promote sharing while simultaneously providing information assurance (i.e., the protection of data and networks).  This way, Allies can have a holistic picture of whatever crisis is occurring and NATO decision-makers can make well-informed, timely and accurate decisions.
        To achieve this ambition, the following must be in place:
        1. Trained ISR experts Having a cadre of experts within NATO who fully understand how to use ISR to support NATO’s decision-makers; and
        2. Information assurance: protection of data and networks Special procedures need to be in place to provide information assurance; it takes time and resources to obtain a genuinely efficient, secure, holistic and relevant Joint ISR system. In fact, it took ten years to develop the successful mission network used in Afghanistan, and NATO intends to capitalise on that effort.

         

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